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Financial Implications of a New
Farm Policy Environment
Lonnie R. Vandeveer, Steven A. Henning,
Gary A. Kennedy, and Chunxiao Li
The 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act dramatically
affects the decision-making environment of farms by introducing provisions for
reducing farm income support payments. These program changes are likely to
affect not only farm incomes, but also farm capital asset markets. The combined
effect of these two financial variables is expected to alter the risk position and the
debt repayment capacity on farms. Empirical results of this analysis indicate that
the absence of farm income support payments reduces debt repayment capacity
and increases the risk position on a representative Louisiana cotton-soybean farm.
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The 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act introduces
provisions for terminating farm income support payments. These program changes
are expected to have a significant influence on farm financial conditions. Program
changes create the potential to depress net farm income, which will have a direct
effect on farm debt repayment. These changes may also affect real estate markets
where program crops are prevalent. Because benefits of government programs are
capitalized into land values (Bullock, Nieuwoudt, and Pasour, 1977; Duffy et al.,
1994), elimination of such programs can have a depressing impact on rural real
estate markets. Any decline in real estate value is likely to cause a decline in farm
equity for owner-operated farms, and a decline in farm equity is expected to increase
financial risk and affect borrowing capacity.
The primary objective of this study is to identify and illustrate potential financial
implications of the new farm policy. We address this problem by evaluating and
comparing estimates of debt repayment and risk for a representative farm with farm
income support and without farm support programs. In our illustration, financial
estimates are developed for a representative 1,374-acre cotton and soybean farm in
the Mississippi Delta of Louisiana.
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Our general approach is to use a financial model developed by Vandeveer and
Kennedy (1996). The effect of cuts in government income support payments on real
estate values comes from an empirical study of rural real estate values (Henning et
al., 1997). Hedonic analysis is used to estimate the capitalized per acre value of real
estate resulting from income support payments. This value, along with elimination
of income support payments, is used in the financial model to estimate debt repay-
ment capacity. The rate of return to equity capital is estimated under certainty and
under risky conditions in the financial model. Maximum debt repayment in the
model represents a range of debt that is feasible to the farm. It does not represent an
optimal level of debt for the firm. Procedures that are based on a safety-first decision
framework, along with the lower confidence interval for the mean rate of return to
equity capital, are used to estimate risk-adjusted maximum debt repayment capacity.
Risk-adjusted estimates provide a measure of debt-carrying capacity when conditions
of certainty are relaxed.
The financial modeling framework is described in the next section. The data and
procedures used in the analysis are then discussed, followed by a presentation of our
results. A final section summarizes the conclusions from the study.
Financial Model
The financial model builds upon concepts originally formulated by Baker and
Hopkin (1969), and later used by Barry, Hopkin, and Baker (1995) to estimate rates
of growth in equity capital for alternative levels of borrowed capital. The farm model
expresses firm growth (annual percentage change in equity capital) as a function
of the rate of return to farm assets, the interest rate paid on debt, the rate of income
taxation, the rate of family consumption from farm earnings, and the level of financial
leverage. The growth model is specified as follows:
(1) g ' (rPa & iP d)(1 & t)(1 & c),
where g represents the rate of growth of equity capital, r is the average net rate of
return to total assets (except for interest and taxes), i is the average interest rate paid
on debt, t is the average rate of income taxation, and c represents the average rate of
family withdrawals for consumption. are ratios and represent assets-to- Pa and Pd
equity and debt-to-equity, respectively. In this model, these ratios must satisfy the
identity of The model generally suggests that returns to equity capital Pa& Pd' 1.
may be increased by adding increasing amounts of debt to the firm when the rate
of return to assets exceeds the interest cost on debt.
The model used in this analysis is a simplified version of a financial leverage
model developed by Vandeveer and Kennedy (1996). It assumes that debt capital
may be used to increase the rate of return to equity capital; however, it is also
assumed that some maximum leverage level exists for the farm firm. This is because,
as debt is added within the firm, successively larger principal payments are requiredVandeveer et al. Financial Implications of a New Farm Policy Environment   239
to repay debt. At some debt level, returns from equity capital being earned within
the firm are not expected to be sufficient to meet principal payments on debt. Maxi-
mum financial leverage is defined by two linear relationships in terms of a debt level
(Pd), where the rate of return to equity capital equals total principal payments
(required rate of equity accumulation). The first linear relationship estimates the rate
of return to equity capital in a single production period, assuming no external sources
of equity capital. The second linear relationship formulates the required rate of equity
formation based on the assumption that the farm firm must make principal payments
on loans if it is to maintain a favorable credit position.
The financial model assumes that non-equity capital may be used to increase the
returns to equity capital and that maximum financial leverage may be estimated from
a two-equation model. The initial equation in this model represents the mean rate of
return to equity (Re) and is estimated by:
(2) Re ' (rPa & iP d & oPa)(1 & t) & c(Pa),
where o is the ratio of total overhead expenses to total assets, and the other variables
are as defined earlier. This model differs from the growth model in that overhead
expenditures are added to the analysis, and the dollar value of assets and the dollar
amount of family consumption are held constant. Holding total assets constant
permits the estimation of the return to equity for different combinations of debt and
equity within the capital structure. Family consumption (c) is estimated as the ratio
of the dollar amount of consumption to total assets. This specification allows family
withdrawals to be held constant in the model, permitting the isolation of the effect
of increasing leverage and its impact on the return to equity capital.
The rate of return to equity capital (Re) is expressed as a linear function of debt
capital structure by solving (2) in terms of Specifically, when is substi- Pd.( 1 % Pd)
tuted for and when known parameters of returns to assets (r), interest cost on Pa,
debt capital (i), overhead expense ratio (o), taxation rate (t), and consumption rate
(c) are substituted into (2), the resulting equation specifies the return to equity
capital as a function of capital structure (Pd).
The second linear equation in the financial model represents a required rate of
equity formation. The required rate of return to equity capital (RN) is defined by the
ratio of total principal payments expressed as a percentage of equity capital. The
required rate of equity formation (RN) is estimated by the sum of the rate of inter-
mediate debt repayment and the rate of fixed debt repayment. This relationship is
defined by:
(3) RN ' (Id)(Pd)(Ip) % (Fd)(Pd)(Fp),
where Id is the proportion of intermediate debt to total debt for the production period,
Ip represents the proportion of outstanding intermediate principal that must be repaid
for the production period, is the proportion of fixed debt to total debt for the pro- Fd
duction period, and is the proportion of outstanding fixed principal that must be Fp240   Fall 2000 Journal of Agribusiness
repaid in the production period. The interpretation of equation (3) is that as debt-to-
equity capital is added in the form of intermediate or fixed debt, the rate of (Pd)
required equity formation (RN) increases. In this analysis, it is assumed that each type
of debt is amortized with constant principal payments. If the above proportions
( are known, then the required rate of return to equity capital (RN) Id, Ip, Fd,a n dFp)
is expressed solely in terms of the debt-to-equity ratio The equation is linear (Pd).
with an intercept of zero.
Equation (2) may be simplified and expressed in terms of debt-to-equity ) (Pd
given known financial parameters for r, i, o, t, and c. Similarly, if Id, Ip, Fd,a n dFp
are known, then the required rate of equity formation (RN) may be expressed solely
in terms of debt-to-equity Since equations (2) and (3) are both linear, each is (Pd).
expressed in terms of and the maximum financial leverage is defined by the point Pd,
where the rate of return to equity equals the required return to equity (Re=RN); thus
maximum financial leverage is estimated by solving the two equations in terms of
Pd (debt-to-equity). For a maximum financial leverage to exist, the intercept term for
Re must be greater than zero and the slope coefficient for Re must be less than that
for RN.
The maximum debt repayment capacity estimated in terms of is not interpreted Pd
as an optimal or desirable capital structure. It is interpreted as an upper endpoint
(maximum) for the amount of debt that may be incorporated into the firm’s capital
structure. Thus, a range of debt that can be incorporated within the capital structure
of the firm is estimated to be between zero debt and maximum debt repayment. In
general, the model uses variables from the firm’s balance sheet and income state-
ments to estimate the rate of return to equity and maximum financial leverage. One
or more of these variables may be changed in the model for analyzing various
financial scenarios. Although there are several methods for maintaining constant
asset values in a single production period, it is assumed in this analysis that asset
replacement occurs at the same rate as asset depreciation.
Risk Analysis
Risk is conceptualized in the financial model at the maximum financial leverage
level. At this single leverage level, if the rate of return to assets is normally
distributed, then the rate of return to equity is also expected to be normally dis-
tributed. Similarly, if the rate of return to equity capital is normally distributed, then
at maximum debt repayment capacity (Re = RN), one-half of the distribution of Re
would be expected to fall above RN, while the other half of the distribution of Re
would be expected to fall below RN. This is because, at maximum debt repayment
capacity, the required rate of equity formation (RN) is fixed by terms of financing.
Moreover, this suggests that the firm would be expected to meet its financial
commitments in only one of two years. With this result, a risk-averse manager would
be expected to operate at a leverage level that is less than maximum debt repayment
capacity.Vandeveer et al. Financial Implications of a New Farm Policy Environment   241
If information is available for the distribution of the rate of return to assets (r),
then the financial model may be modified to consider risk across all defined leverage
levels. Specifically, the financial leverage model is extended to include risk con-
siderations by estimating the lower confidence limit for the mean rate of return to
equity (Re). The lower confidence limit for the mean rate of return to equity (RL) is
estimated by:
(4) RL ' Re & (zα/2)(σe/ n ),
where Re, defined in equation (2), is expressed as a linear function of On the Pd.
right-hand side of equation (4), z is the standard normal random variable, α is a
confidence coefficient, σe is the standard deviation for the mean rate of return to
equity, and n corresponds to the number of observations in the sample. The standard
deviation of the rate of return to equity (σe) is estimated as:
(5) σe ' (σr)(Pa)(1 & t),
where σr is the standard deviation of the rate of return to assets for the farm enter-
prise portfolio, with the other variables as defined previously. Thus, the standard
deviation of returns to equity is a standard deviation of the portfolio weighted by
the asset-to-equity structure and rate of taxation. Since σr and t are known, and
the standard deviation of the rate of return to equity may be expressed Pa' 1% Pd,
in terms of debt-to-equity Also, since both Re and may be (Pd). (zα/2)(σe/ n )
expressed in terms of the lower confidence limit for the mean rate of return to Pd,
equity (RL) is expressed as a linear function of Pd.
A risk-adjusted measure of debt-carrying capacity is estimated by equating equa-
tions (3) and (4) (RN=RL) and solving for For risk-adjusted maximum debt- Pd.
carrying capacity to exist, the intercept term for RL must be greater than zero and the
slope of RL must be less than that for RN. The risk-adjusted maximum leverage level
is interpreted to represent an upper limit of debt-to-equity for a specified degree of
confidence that the rate of return to equity exceeds the required rate of return to
equity (Re $ RN). A firm is expected to meet its financial commitments with a speci-
fied degree of confidence for a capital structure ranging from zero to the estimated
risk-adjusted maximum financial leverage. Beyond risk-adjusted maximum financial
leverage, the required rate of return to equity capital exceeds the lower limit of the
rate of return to equity capital, and the firm will not meet its financial commitments
for the specified degree of confidence.
Data and Procedures
The effects of government support programs on debt-carrying capacity are examined
using the financial leverage model. Debt-carrying capacity is estimated for a
representative 1,374-acre cotton and soybean farm in the Mississippi Delta area of242   Fall 2000 Journal of Agribusiness











   Sandy soil 629    629  
   Clay soil 745    745  
Crop Acreage:
   Cotton, sandy soil 629    629  
   Soybeans, clay soil 745    745  
Capital Assets ($):
   Machinery 436,932    436,932  
   Land 1,004,585    930,363  
   Total 1,441,517    1,367,295  
Enterprise Statistics ($):
   Cotton mean net return to assets 215.40    154.83  
   Cotton standard deviation 106.41    112.54  
   Soybean mean net return to assets 100.75    100.75  
   Soybean standard deviation 38.96    38.96  
Financial Parameters:
   Average interest rate (%) 10.00    10.00  
   Average income taxation (t) (%) 20.00    20.00  
   Ratio, intermediate to total debt  0.30    0.30   (Id)
   Repayment rate, intermediate  0.20    0.20   (Ip)
   Ratio, fixed to total debt  0.70    0.70   (Fd)
   Repayment rate, fixed debt  0.05    0.05   (Fp)
   Overhead expenses (o) (as % of total capital assets) 1.845    1.945  
   Family withdrawals (c) (as % of total capital assets) 1.734    1.828  
Louisiana. In table 1, farm scenarios assume government participation and no govern-
ment participation. In each scenario, cotton is produced on sandy soil and soybeans
are produced on clay soils.
Land values presented in table 1 are based on a study by Henning et al. (1997)
of real estate values in Louisiana. For the scenario with government participation,
land value is based on a median per acre value of $800 from 45 cotton sales in
1996, and a median per acre value of $673 for 33 soybean land sales. The value of
land for the without government program scenario differs from the first scenario
by the capitalized value of government program benefits of $118 per acre computed
across the cotton acreage. This estimate was derived from a hedonic analysis of 206Vandeveer et al. Financial Implications of a New Farm Policy Environment   243
rural land sales that occurred between 1993 and 1996 in the Mississippi Delta area
of Louisiana. The marginal implicit price in the first-stage hedonic analysis indicates
that tracts with cotton base acres sell for $118 more per acre than tracts with no
cotton base acreage.
Mean per acre dollar return to assets and associated standard deviations for cotton
and soybean enterprises (table 1) were estimated from experimental yields for the
period 1979S96 at the Northeast Agricultural Research Station and from commodity
prices adjusted to 1996 dollars. The mean per acre return to assets was estimated at
$215.40 and $100.75 for cotton and soybeans, respectively. Statistical tests of each
distribution did not indicate a departure from normality.
Financial parameters shown in table 1 indicate that in each scenario intermediate
debt is assumed to account for 30% of total debt, and fixed debt is assumed to
account for 70% of total debt within the farm. The repayment rate (Ip) indicates that
intermediate loans are repaid in five years, whereas fixed or long-term loans are (Fp)
repaid in 20 years. Overhead and family living expenses are estimated at $26,600
and $25,000, respectively, and are expressed as a percentage of total capital assets
in table 1.
The financial model, along with other parameters presented in table 1, was used to
estimate maximum financial leverage and risk-adjusted maximum financial leverage
for each farm scenario. A microcomputer spreadsheet was used to solve for maximum
financial leverage and risk-adjusted maximum financial leverage and to compute
financial variables across leverage levels and farm scenarios. Risk-adjusted maximum
financial leverage was estimated assuming that the farm business wishes to meet all
of its financial commitments in at least nine of ten years. Risk-adjusted maximum
leverage and probability estimates were computed using a Student’s t-distribution
(tα/2 with 17 degrees of freedom), with t = 1.333.
Results
Maximum debt repayment capacity estimates with and without government program
participation are presented in table 2. Maximum debt repayment capacity with
government program participation is estimated at a debt-to-equity level of 0.9389,
or 48% debt. At this leverage level, the rate of return to equity capital of 8.92% is
equal to the required rate of equity formation (8.92%). Without government program
participation, maximum debt repayment capacity is estimated at a debt-to-equity level
of 0.6211 (38% debt).
Estimates reported in table 2 are illustrated in figure 1. In figure 1, the rate of return
to equity (Re) increases as debt is added to the capital structure of the representative
farm with government program participation (positive slope). However, the rate of
return to equity (Re) has a negative slope when government program benefits are not
included, suggesting that increasing debt within the capital structure of the farm
decreases the rate of return to equity capital. Estimates illustrated in figure 1 show
that maximum debt repayment capacity is substantially less without government244   Fall 2000 Journal of Agribusiness
Table 2. Estimated Debt Repayment Capacity With and Without Government






















 (Re > RN)
WITH GOVERNMENT PROGRAM PARTICIPATION
0.0000 0.0847 0.0000 0.0725 0.0390 0.9999
0.2000 0.0857 0.0190 0.0710 0.0469 0.9999
0.4000 0.0866 0.0380 0.0695 0.0547 0.9992
0.4369 0.0868 0.0415 0.0692 0.0561 0.9984
0.6000 0.0876 0.0570 0.0680 0.0625 0.9734
0.6211 0.0877 0.0590 0.0678 0.0633 0.9643
0.7069
 a 0.0881 0.0672 0.0672 0.0666 0.9000
0.8000 0.0885 0.0760 0.0665 0.0703 0.7702
0.9389
 b 0.0892 0.0892 0.0654 0.0757 0.5000
1.0000 0.0895 0.0950 0.0649 0.0781 0.3840
WITHOUT GOVERNMENT PROGRAM PARTICIPATION
0.0000 0.0670 0.0000 0.0532 0.0441 0.9999
0.2000 0.0645 0.0190 0.0479 0.0529 0.9990
0.4000 0.0619 0.0380 0.0425 0.0617 0.9405
0.4369
 a 0.0614 0.0415 0.0415 0.0633 0.9000
0.6000 0.0593 0.0570 0.0371 0.0705 0.5538
0.6211
 b 0.0590 0.0590 0.0366 0.0714 0.5000
0.7069 0.0579 0.0672 0.0343 0.0752 0.3041
0.8000 0.0567 0.0760 0.0318 0.0793 0.1580
0.9389 0.0549 0.0892 0.0281 0.0854 0.0533
1.0000 0.0541 0.0950 0.0264 0.0881 0.0327
a Risk-adjusted maximum debt repayment capacity.
b Maximum debt repayment capacity.
program participation. It is also noted that maximum financial leverage levels are
estimated to help identify a range of debt that is feasible for the firm, and they do not
represent optimal or desirable levels of debt.
Results in table 2 indicate that risk-adjusted maximum debt capacity is greater for
the government program scenario than for the scenario without government program
participation. Risk-adjusted maximum debt capacity with government program parti-
cipation is estimated at a debt-to-equity level of 0.7069 (41% debt). This same estimate
for the scenario without government program participation is 0.4369 (30% debt).
As reported in table 2, the farm is expected to meet all of its financial commitments
in nine of ten years (probability of 0.9) at risk-adjusted maximum debt capacity forVandeveer et al. Financial Implications of a New Farm Policy Environment   245
Figure 1. Maximum debt repayment capacity with and without govern-
ment program, Mississippi Delta cotton and soybean farm, 1996
Figure 2. Risk-adjusted maximum debt repayment capacity with and
without government program, Mississippi Delta cotton and soybean
farm, 1996246   Fall 2000 Journal of Agribusiness
each of the scenarios. Results illustrated in figure 2 indicate that risk-adjusted debt
capacity is substantially less for the scenario without government program partici-
pation than the scenario with participation.
The financial model is also used to estimate the probability that farm scenarios
in this analysis will meet all of their financial commitments in at least nine of
ten years. Comparisons of probability estimates for farm scenarios presented in
figure 3 ranging between zero and a debt-to-equity ratio of 0.3 do not indicate
a large difference in the ability of the farm business in meeting its financial
commitments. However, a sizable difference in probabilities is observed for the
two farm scenarios beyond a debt-to-equity level of 0.3. For example, at a debt-
to-equity ratio of 0.7 (41% debt), the probability of meeting financial commit-
ments is 0.907 for the farm scenario with government program participation,
whereas this probability is estimated at 0.318 for the farm scenario without
government program participation. For the ranges of debt considered in figure
3, the results show that the principle of increasing risk is more pronounced in
the farm scenario without government program participation than the scenario
with participation.
Figure 3.  Probability, with and without government program participation,
of meeting financial commitments in nine of ten years, Mississippi Delta
cotton and soybean farm, 1996Vandeveer et al. Financial Implications of a New Farm Policy Environment   247
Conclusions
Results presented here suggest that future farm policy changes have the potential to
affect farm financial conditions not only through decreasing farm income support
payments (which decrease farm income), but also through capital asset markets
(which could decrease asset values and farm equity). Our findings show that cotton
farms in the Mississippi Delta area of Louisiana sell for $118 per acre more than
similar farms without cotton base acres. Based on these results, the combined effects
of income reduction and a decline in the capital asset market reduce debt repayment
capacity on a representative cotton and soybean farm in the Mississippi Delta area
of Louisiana.
Other findings suggest that risk differences for farm scenarios with and with-
out government programs are much larger at relatively high levels of debt than
for lower levels of debt on the representative farm, implying that policy changes
could have a relatively larger effect on highly leveraged farms than on those with
less financial leverage. These findings also point to an increased need for financial
management, and especially debt management in the farm, as new farm policy is
implemented.
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